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Abstract: Research on European integration posits that people support and identify with the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) by considering its economic benefits. Thus, it is argued that people’s sense of 
identity and their degree of political support for the EU can be explained by estimating the econom-
ic prosperity it yields. However, the current paper illustrates that in addition to utilitarian factors, 
media use can also explain political support for the EU. Thus, to examine this relationship between 
political support and the media, the study uses the political support framework by David Easton 
along with the theoretical underpinnings of the media malaise and media mobilization effects. The 
empirical analysis is conducted on the basis of secondary data obtained through Eurobarometer 
surveys. Furthermore, to test if the economic factors are a strong predictor of political support, the 
study assumes that the recent Eurozone crisis has caused a sharp decline in political support. 
Therefore, it investigates the role of different economic factors and media on political support be-
fore and after the crisis. The results indicate that consuming information from the television (TV) 
does not lead to malaise but rather, that it has a mobilization effect. Furthermore, the results reveal 
that the respondents’ informed-ness and their TV usage for getting information predict political 
support better than the economic indicators. 
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Introduction 
 
In the recent times, the European Union (EU) has faced a number of difficult chal-
lenges, including the Eurozone’s financial crisis, Britain’s decision to leave the EU 
(Brexit), and the refugee crisis. As a consequence of these political developments, 
one can clearly see a shift in the political support for both the EU and the process 
of European integration. Among all these issues, the Eurozone crisis particularly 
exemplifies the erosion of support for European integration by raising many ques-
tions, including the EU’s ability to sustain economic growth and foster a sense of 
belonging and identity among Europeans (Luhmann, 2017). Due to the Eurozone 
crisis, several EU member states were forced to reduce their government spending 
and opt for austerity measures, which resulted in changes to the political landscape 
and even led to governments being ousted in Ireland and Greece (CNN, 2017). 
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Therefore, the Eurozone crisis can be said to have negatively impacted citizens’ 
perceptions of the EU and prompted a decline in political support for both national 
governments and the EU (Armingeon & Ceka, 2014).  
 
The reason behind the negative effect of the Eurozone crisis on political support at 
the European level is that the economic benefits and utilitarian factors have always 
been considered as a major source of support for the process of European integra-
tion (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007; Gabel, 1998; Mclaren, 2006). Therefore, schol-
ars believe that it is this cost–benefit relationship between the EU and its citizens 
that has led people to support the European political community, and that, in turn, 
has allowed Europeans to develop a certain sense of belonging and identification 
with the EU (Schäfer & Weber, 2014). Hence, the argument that economic pros-
perity can instill a sense of collective identity among Europeans gained promi-
nence in the literature, eventually making it one of the main explanatory factors 
behind the political support for the EU (Carey, 2002; Fuchs, 2011; Weßels, 2007). 
Consequently, aligning with this viewpoint, the current paper maintains that the 
Eurozone financial debacle may have negatively influenced the overall political 
support for the EU, including Europeans having a sense of a collective European 
identity. However, it is important to state that utilitarian factors alone are not suf-
ficient to explain political support; researchers have found that affective factors 
such as post-material values can also influence political support (Boomgaarden, 
Schuck, Elenbaas, & de Vreese, 2011; Inglehart, 1977). 
 
In addition to the economic crisis, the current research also postulates that eco-
nomic factors alone may not be responsible for waning political support and the 
decline in people’s sense of European identity. Media use might also have an effect 
on political support, as past studies that have investigated the role of the media 
and public opinion on the EU revealed that the media have the ability to influence 
political attitudes and people’s sense of European identity as well as attachment 
toward the EU (de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006; Hillje, 2013; Peter, 2007; Stae-
helin, 2016).  
 
However, despite the general agreement among scholars on the importance the 
media have in terms of affecting public opinion on European integration (de 
Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006; Meyer, 1999), few studies (see e.g., Baccini, Sudu-
lich, & Wall, 2016; Michailidou & Trenz, 2014; Picard, 2015) have explored the 
connection between media consumption and people’s sense of their European 
identity, particularly in the context of the Eurozone crisis. Those researchers who 
did study the relationship between media consumption and the Eurozone crisis fo-
cused primarily on exploring either how the media covered the EU amidst the cri-
sis (e.g., Hobolt & Tilley, 2014; Picard, 2015), or on understanding the media’s role 
as a facilitator in making people more Euro-skeptical (Conti & Memoli, 2017). 
Therefore, the lack of research regarding the effects of the media on people’s sense 
of their European identity following the Eurozone crisis points toward a research 
gap.  
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To fill this research gap, the author initially aims at descriptively showing how the 
levels of different indicators of political support, including European identity, vary 
before and after the crisis. The descriptive statistics allow for an assessment of the 
correlation between the Eurozone crisis and both support and identity in different 
EU member states. The second goal of the paper is to test if media use along with 
other political support indicators affect that European identity, and if this effect 
varies before and after the crisis among different EU member states, as each of 
them was affected by the crisis differently. In essence, the study tests the long-
standing thesis that only an economically beneficial relationship between a mem-
ber state and the EU will propagate a European identity among that member 
state’s citizens, and if media use also has the ability to explain the variations in the 
citizens’ sense of European identity following the Eurozone crisis.  
 
Before examining the assumptions empirically, a theoretical framework of political 
support taken from David Easton (1965, 1975) is employed in the following section 
of the paper to conceptualize what we mean by a European identity. Subsequently, 
to assess the media effects, the study uses the theoretical underpinnings of the me-
diamalaise and media mobilization effects. Afterwards, the paper presents the op-
erationalization of the independent and dependent variables along with the empir-
ical analysis. Then, in the last section, the paper concludes by discussing the key 
findings and limitations of the study. 
 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 
Political Support  
The persistence of scholars in terms of finding ways in which to compare the forms 
of governing institutions and political support cultures can be traced back to Aris-
totle (Klingemann, 1999). However, modern theorists have extensively used David 
Easton’s (1965, 1975) concept of political support to approach this issue. It is quite 
a useful analytical framework as it distinguishes among support for the political 
community, regime, and the authorities (Norris, 1999). While explaining the dif-
ferences among these three objects, Klingemann (1999) argued that a political 
community is a cultural object that goes beyond the particularities of formal gov-
erning structures and marks the collective identity of the polity. Meanwhile, the 
regime constitutes the basic framework for governance (Norris, 1999), and the po-
litical authorities are the officials occupying governmental posts (Klingemann, 
1999). The current study adopts the following modified representation of Easton’s 
political support framework developed by Fuchs (2011). 
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Table 1: Types and constructs of political support 
Types of Political 
Support  
Constructs of 
Political Support 
Sub-constructs of Political 
Support 
Political community 
Sense of community (diffuse 
support) 
 
Identity  European identity 
Regime 
Legitimacy (diffuse support) 
 
Trust (diffuse support) 
 
Legitimacy 
 
Trust 
 Satisfaction with European 
democracy 
 Trust in EU institutions 
Political authorities 
(specific support) 
 
Short-term output 
evaluation 
 Evaluation of the national and 
European economies 
 
 
The first and second columns of Table 1 denote the types and constructs of political 
support according to Easton, whereas the sub-constructs of political support are 
operationalized on the basis of the available data. Furthermore, the table also 
shows how Easton (1965) classified the political support for the three aforemen-
tioned objects into two distinct types (i.e. diffuse and specific support). Diffuse 
support is mainly associated with the political community and regime, and it does 
not focus on the performances of certain components, but rather of the system as a 
whole (Beaudonnet & Di Mauro, 2012; Fuchs, 2011). To understand what the dif-
fuse support for these two political objects is, it is imperative that we look at each 
object individually. 
 
With reference to diffuse support for the political community, Easton (1965) de-
scribed it as a “sense of community,” “we-feeling,” or as a “feeling of belonging to-
gether” (p. 185). This idea of a communal feeling corresponds to the concept of 
identity (Bruter, 2005; Delanty, 2002; Hooghe & Marks, 2005), and, according to 
social psychological theories, such an identity is part of a person’s self-concept and 
of his or her affective assignment to a social group (Herrmann & Brewer, 2004; 
Tajfel, 1981). Since the EU has transformed itself from a purely economic commu-
nity into a socio-political community (European Union, 2017), it aspires for more 
Europeans to assign themselves to—and to feel attached to—the Union. Therefore, 
an affective feeling of belonging to the EU by individuals corresponds to the idea of 
belonging to a collective community, thus instilling a sense of European identity. 
Thus, in light of the given arguments, the present study considers this affective 
feeling of belonging to the EU—a political community—as a European identity that 
resonates with the concept of diffuse support for the political community (Schäfer 
& Weber, 2014).  
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It is pertinent here to highlight that the concept of a European identity is anything 
but straightforward. The abundant research on the topic has not yielded a single 
agreeable definition. This disaccord over the concept of identity has prompted 
scholars to suggest that due to its imprecise and contradictory nature, it should not 
be investigated (Brubaker & Cooper, 2000). However, despite such scholarly 
gloom, researchers have never abandoned the idea of exploring identity, and one 
can see some level of agreement, at least in the operationalization of identity in 
general and of a European identity in particular, because numerous scholars have 
used affective attachment—referred to as a we-feeling or as feeling a part of a 
common collective—as an apt way of conceptualizing the European identity 
(Easton, 1965; Fuchs, 2011; Scharpf, 1999; Schäfer & Weber, 2014). Therefore, this 
study also uses an affective self-attachment to the EU for the operationalization of 
its dependent variable: European identity.  
 
Moving on to the second component of the political support framework, Easton 
(1965, 1975) argued that within any political system, the regime also requires dif-
fuse support. However, he differentiated diffuse support for the regime by specify-
ing two additional dimensions: legitimacy and trust. According to Easton (1975), 
legitimacy “reflects the fact that in some vague or explicit way [a person] sees these 
objects as conforming to his own moral principles, his own sense of what is right 
and proper in the political sphere” (p. 451). The second dimension of trust is ex-
plained by Easton (1975) as something that “will be stimulated by the experiences 
that members have of the authorities over time” (p. 448). In light of these explana-
tions, the study operationalizes legitimacy through people’s satisfaction with the 
democracy in the EU, whereas trust is operationalized as trust in the EU. It is im-
portant to mention here that diffuse support for a regime does not serve as a de-
pendent variable in the current empirical analysis, but as an independent variable. 
The second type of support mentioned by Easton is called specific support, which 
is an attitude (or a behavior) produced by the evaluation of the authorities’ actions 
(Beaudonnet & Di Mauro, 2012). Thus, specific support is based on the perceived 
rewards of short-term outputs (Fuchs, 2011). Since the study is related to the Eu-
rozone crisis, it therefore makes sense to consider EU citizens’ evaluations of the 
national and European economies as indicators of specific support for the respec-
tive political authorities. It is also important to highlight that because the national 
economy of each EU member state and the European economy are interdependent 
on each other, evaluations of both economies will provide suitable indicators for 
measuring specific support for political incumbents.  
 
The following section particularly discusses the role of the media and people’s 
sense of European identity by reviewing the literature and then it outlines the the-
oretical underpinnings of the media malaise and media mobilization theory.  
 
The Media and a European Identity 
The idea that the media play a crucial role in forming and affecting collective iden-
tities has been confirmed by scholars in various contexts (Bruch & Pfister, 2014; 
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Fornas, 1995; Morley, 2001; Schlesinger, 1991; Silverstone 1999). For instance, 
Georgiou (2006) states that “media … have become organized mechanisms of great 
significance for constructing identities in local, national and transnational contexts 
within modernity” (p. 11). Such a role being played by the media on identity is also 
endorsed at the official level by the European Broadcasting Union’s assertion in 
1993 that broadcasting played a decisive role in the affirmation of a collective iden-
tity in the then newly-formed Central and Eastern European democracies (Luce, 
1993).  
Taking the literature on the media and the European identity into consideration, a 
great amount of research focuses on the development of a European identity by 
investigating the mechanisms through which journalistic practices, choices, and 
professional norms affect citizens’ attitudes toward the EU (Clement, 2015; de 
Vreese, Boomgaarden, & Semetko, 2011; de Vreese & Kandyla, 2009; Vliegenthart, 
Schuk, Boomgaarden, & de Vreese, 2008).  
 
In addition to how the media present the EU, only rarely have scholars tried to pay 
attention to measuring the effects of the media. Carey and Burton (2004), for ex-
ample, used a content analysis of newspaper editorials along with survey data to 
study attitudes toward the Euro in the UK and found that the British press had an 
influence on the attitudes of their readers. De Vreese and Boomgarden (2006) 
combined a two-wave panel study with a content analysis to investigate how the 
tone and amount of news in the mass media affect the evaluation of EU enlarge-
ment, and their results confirmed that the mass media matter. Schuck and de 
Vreese (2006) looked into newspaper articles framing the EU enlargement as a 
risk or as an opportunity, and they found that framing had significant effects on 
the readers’ political support for enlargement.  
 
However, despite highlighting the significant relationship between the media and 
political attitudes, research on its effects in general, and on European identity in 
particular, still represents an “embryonic field of study” (Maier & Rittberger, 2008, 
p. 248), and it requires more empirical investigations to reveal how the media af-
fect people’s political identities (de Vreese & Boomgaarden, 2006, p. 421). In their 
recent study, Conti and Memoli (2016) complained that although the influence of 
the media on people’s understanding of politics and their perceptions about poli-
tics has been confirmed in the literature, the media’s impact on attitudes toward 
the EU has been rather neglected in the empirical literature. They further claimed 
that increasing attention has actually been paid to media representations about the 
EU (Bayley & Williams, 2012; de Wilde, Michailidou, & Trenz, 2013) but the direct 
impact of the media on support for the EU has only rarely been analyzed empiri-
cally (Conti & Memoli, 2016).  
 
In the same vein, Maier and Rittberger (2008) stated that, with few exceptions, the 
literature on public opinion and EU integration has thus far neglected the role of 
the media in affecting attitudes toward feeling European, whereas Müller, Reck-
ling, and Weiß (2014) stated that the majority of researchers who focus on the me-
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dia and identity have so far mainly concentrated on the present situation without 
examining the long-term structures that might have led to it. However, despite the 
criticism, attention is gradually increasing in terms of exploring the relationship 
between a European identity and the media (see e.g., Bachofer, 2014; de Vreese, 
2007; Guerra & Caiani, 2017; Hillje, 2013; Mourao et al., 2015; Staehelin, 2016).  
Within the context of the Euro crisis, a substantial body of literature has been pro-
duced, but much of the research is focused on the economic effects of the Eurozone 
crisis, support for a common currency, a rise in Euro-skepticism, and evaluations 
of the EU institutions’ response to the crisis (Clements, Nanou, & Verney, 2014; 
Hobolt & Tilley, 2014; Hobolt & Wratil, 2015; Ioannou, Leblond, & Niemann, 
2015). Hence, firstly, very few have even investigated the relationship between the 
media and a European identity in the context of the Euro crisis, secondly, those 
who did study this relationship kept their focus on how the media covered the EU 
during the crisis (Michailidou & Trenz, 2014; Picard, 2015), therefore not analyz-
ing the direct impact of media use in explaining people’s sense of their European 
identity after the Euro crisis (with the exception of Conti & Memoli, 2016).  
 
Here, it is also important to note that the scholarship on media studies covers a 
wide range of different media effects, but, when it comes to investigating the ef-
fects of the media on political support and the European identity, scholars have 
primarily focused merely on agenda setting, priming, and framing effects (see de 
Vreese, 2007; Michailidou & Trenz, 2014; Maier & Rittberger, 2008; Semetko, 
2004), whereas there are a number of other effects that can also help explain polit-
ical attitudes and support, especially toward the EU. Thus, to advance the scholar-
ship on the change in people’s sense of their European identity and the role of the 
media along with other political support indicators, the current study examines the 
media malaise and media mobilization effects on citizens’ European identity before 
and after the Euro crisis. The following sub-section outlines the basic conceptual 
undertaking of the said media effects.  
 
Media (Video) Malaise vs. Mobilization 
When it comes to the effects of the media on political attitudes, a variety of studies 
have focused on media use as the explanatory variable. One particular effect that 
has been examined, and which is also the focus of this study, is media malaise. The 
concept of malaise emerged in the literature when Kurt and Gladys Lang (1966) 
connected the increase in news consumption with feelings of disenchantment with 
American politics for the first time. They further argued that television (TV) broad-
casts fueled public cynicism by over-emphasizing political conflict and downplay-
ing routine policy-making (Norris, 2000). However, the malaise effect was not giv-
en much attention until Michael Robinson (1976) first coined the term “video ma-
laise” to highlight the connection between the reliance upon American TV journal-
ism and feelings of political cynicism, social mistrust, and a lack of political effica-
cy. In his research, Robinson (1976) confirmed that the more time citizens spent 
watching TV, the further their political support sank. However, with regard to me-
dia use and its effect, particularly on support for the EU, past research confirms 
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that media use can undermine political support for the EU, not in all, but at least 
in some member states (Van Aelst, 2017). At this point, it is important to mention 
that the current study also only focuses on the malaise effect of TV, thus we use the 
term “video” and “media” malaise interchangeably while referring only to its nega-
tive effect, which in essence is a decline in political support in those who use TV as 
a medium. 
 
In addition to media use, the effects of media content have also been analyzed by 
various scholars. Consequently, negative political news has been found to have a 
positive relationship with low levels of public confidence (Floss, 2008). For in-
stance, Miller, Goldenberg, and Erbing (1979) found that media criticism led to 
dissatisfaction with political leaders and policies. Along the same lines, several 
studies indicate that negative media content affects attitudes, particularly toward 
persons (Kepplinger, 2000; Kleinnijenhuis, van Hoof, & Oegema, 2006), but also 
toward institutions such as the presidency, the government (Patterson, 1996), and 
the EU, specifically (Trendz, 2008).  
 
The counter-argument to the malaise effect is also quite compelling. It claims that 
the media are not associated with a malaise, but there is instead an opposite effect 
called “mobilization” (Newton, 1999, p. 580). For instance, Norris (1996, 2000) 
argued in her studies that general TV watching is related to apathy; however, con-
trary to the video malaise hypothesis, attention being paid to the news media was 
associated with positive indicators of civic engagement. Furthermore, Newton 
(1999) found that reading a broadsheet newspaper in Britain and watching a sig-
nificant amount of TV news were associated with greater political knowledge, in-
terest, and understanding. Holtz-Bacha (1990) demonstrated similar patterns as-
sociated with attention being paid to the news media in Germany, while Curtice, 
Schmitt-Beck, and Schrott (1998) also reported positive findings in terms of media 
use and political knowledge. In an exhaustive study, Bennett, Rhine, Flickinger, 
and Bennet (1999) found that trust in politics and trust in the news media go 
hand-in-hand, with no evidence that use of the news media is related to political 
cynicism. Within the European context, scholars have found similar positive rela-
tionships between media use and variables such as political knowledge (Aarts & 
Semetko, 2003), political interest (Strömbäck & Shehata, 2010), political partici-
pation (Schuck, Vliegenthart, & de Vreese, 2016), and also political trust (Adriaan-
sen, van Praag, & de Vreese, 2010). 
 
In light of the given arguments for both the malaise and mobilization effects, the 
current study seeks to examine both effects on the European identity before and 
after the Euro crisis in different EU member states.  
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Hypotheses 
 
On the basis of the previously stated arguments construed from established theo-
ries, the current section outlines three hypotheses. The first hypothesis aims to de-
scriptively show the impact of the Eurozone crisis on both diffuse and specific sup-
port for all three objects (i.e. political community, regime, and political authorities) 
among all member states. The assumption here is that political support, irrespec-
tive of its type, has declined after the crisis, and this fall is more noticeable among 
countries that were most affected by the crisis. The rationality for such an assump-
tion stems from Easton’s theory, according to which positive experiences with the 
current authorities of a political system lead to specific support for these authori-
ties, and, over some time, generate diffuse support for the regime and political 
community (Easton, 1975; Weßels, 2007). On the contrary, negative experiences 
result in discontent and a lack of political support. Similarly, Weßels (2007) argues 
that a crisis with negative outcomes should cumulate and translate into lower po-
litical support toward the regime, political authorities, and also the withdrawal of 
identification with the political community in question. Therefore, in light of this 
argument, the first hypothesis is stated as follows: 
  
Hypothesis 1: Due to the Eurozone crisis, political support in Europe has 
decreased, especially in those member states that were most affected by the 
crisis. 
 
The second hypothesis (H2) deals with the ability of TV use for gathering infor-
mation regarding EU affairs to affect the citizens’ sense of their European identity. 
According to video malaise, when consuming information from the TV, people be-
come more cynical toward the political system. In the case of the EU, research has 
convincingly shown that media coverage of the EU is more negative than it is posi-
tive (de Vreese et al., 2011; Michailidou & Trenz, 2014). Additionally, unlike other 
indicators of political support, a collective sense of identity in a political communi-
ty develops over a longer period of time (Walkenhorst, 2008) and provides a buffer 
against the erosion of political support when there is a crisis (Weßels, 2007). But, 
the current study assumes that despite being more resilient against a crisis, the Eu-
rozone crisis, coupled with consistent negative coverage of the EU, negatively af-
fected the EU citizens’ sense of their European identity, consequently making peo-
ple feel less attached to the respective political system particularly, and such an ef-
fect is more visible in the most affected countries. Therefore, the malaise hypothe-
sis is stated as follows: 
 
Hypothesis 2: The use of television as an information source has a nega-
tive effect on the citizens’ European identity and this effect is stronger in the 
countries most affected by the Eurozone crisis.  
 
As previously noted, the counter-argument to video malaise is media mobilization 
(Newton, 1999), which asserts that media use is not associated with negative but 
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positive attitudes toward political institutions. Hence, the final hypothesis posits 
that people usually get their information about political institutions from the me-
dia, and this improves their level of information while making them more aware, 
subsequently empowering them to support a given political structure on the basis 
of acquired information. Hence, the third hypothesis states: 
 
Hypothesis 3: An increasing level of information about the EU has a posi-
tive effect on an individual’s European identity. 
 
To analyze these hypotheses, a secondary data analysis is conducted. The following 
section outlines the design of the study and the operationalization of the data.  
 
 
Study Design 
 
The empirical analysis of the study is based on secondary data obtained from two 
different Eurobarometer surveys: One was conducted in 2006 (before the Euro-
zone crisis) and the other in 2013 (after the crisis). The reasons behind choosing 
the specific time periods are, firstly, to determine the effects of the economic crisis 
and the media on political support before and after the crisis, and secondly, the 
availability of relevant variables. Ideally, the Eurobarometer survey conducted just 
before the Euro crisis (2008 or 2009) would have been perfect to use for the study, 
but the absence of the required variables forced the researcher to select the data 
obtained from the 2006 Eurobarometer survey. As for after the crisis, different 
studies point to 2013 as a turning point for the Eurozone crisis, after which the 
economic indicators started to show positive trends (Braun & Tausendpfund, 
2014). Hence, the current study uses the data released in November 2013 to ana-
lyze post-crisis public opinion. 
 
As noted, this study classifies EU member states on the basis of how hard they 
were hit by the Eurozone crisis. To undertake the categorization, the author has 
used the real gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate volume as the basis for 
classifying different member states. The calculation of the annual growth rate in 
GDP volume is intended to allow for comparisons of the dynamics of economic de-
velopment both over time and between economies of different sizes (Eurostat, 
2017). Since the literature points to different EU member states being affected dif-
ferently by the Eurozone crisis of 2010–13 (Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014; Schäfer 
& Weber, 2014), it therefore makes sense to categorize countries into separate 
groups on the basis of their respective GDP growth rate between 2010 and 2013. 
Thus, to classify EU member states into two groups (i.e. the least and most affect-
ed), the author has calculated the average GDP growth of each member state be-
tween 2010 and 2013 (see the Annex for more details).  
 
The classification based on the GDP growth rate groups Greece, Spain, Italy, Cy-
prus, Portugal, and Slovenia among the most affected EU member states, whereas 
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all the other countries were relatively less affected. It is important to note here that 
Romania, Bulgaria, and Croatia became EU members in 2008 and 2013, respec-
tively, so they are not included in the current analysis. In the following section, the 
author details the operationalization of each variable. 
 
Operationalization of the Variables 
This section explains which questions from the surveys are used as variables for 
the final data analysis. First, the dependent variable in the study is operationalized 
using the following question: “Please tell me, how attached do you feel to the Eu-
ropean Union?” using a scale from 1 (not attached at all) to 4 (very attached). This 
question aligns with the concept of the subjective assignment of individuals to the 
collective, and the same question has been used in several studies (Bruter, 2005; 
Fuchs, 2011; Schäfer & Weber, 2014) to assess the European identity. 
 
The independent media variable in this study is operationalized using the follow-
ing question: “When you are looking for information about the European Union, 
its policies, its institutions, which of the following sources do you use? (1) Meet-
ings; (2) Discussions with relatives, friends, colleagues; (3) Daily newspapers; (4) 
Other newspapers, magazines; (5) Television; (6) Radio; (7) The Internet; (8) 
Books, brochures, information leaflets; (9) Other; and (10) Never look for such in-
formation, not interested.” The respondents were asked to choose from among 
multiple media sources, but the study included only those respondents who select-
ed “Television” as an information source for European political matters. This is be-
cause the current study only investigates the “video malaise” effect that is associat-
ed with TV, and also most respondents selected TV as their main source of infor-
mation. Additionally, scholars have not found compelling evidence to suggest that 
print media invoke political cynicism (Newton, 1999; Norris, 1996). 
The second independent variable is used to assess the effect of media mobilization 
on the European identity and is operationalized through the following question: 
“To what extent do you think that you are informed or not about European mat-
ters?” The respondents were asked to evaluate their level of information according 
to a 4-point scale: 4 (very well informed), 3 (fairly well informed), 2 (not very well 
informed), and 1 (not at all informed). It is important to highlight the rationale be-
hind testing the media mobilization hypothesis through this question. It is clear 
that the question itself does not point to any role for the media in terms of acquir-
ing information, so one may not be sure about the adequacy of the item in terms of 
it operationalizing the media mobilization effect. In response to that, it can be rea-
soned that because people do not have direct experience with distant and abstract 
political structures (Page & Shapiro, 1992), and the EU is definitely one such poli-
ty, they must therefore rely on the information they acquire through the media. 
Additionally, this notion is also confirmed from the current data analysis that re-
veals a strong positive relationship between people being informed about the EU 
and their use of TV. Thus, this question seems fit to be used for the operationaliza-
tion of the media mobilization effect on the European identity. 
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Two additional indicators (satisfaction with the democracy and trust in the EU) are 
examined regarding the operationalization of individual political attitudes toward 
the diffuse support for the regime. The predictor “democracy” is operationalized 
through the question: “How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the 
EU?” The answers were assessed based on a 4-point scale: 4 (very satisfied), 3 
(fairly satisfied), 2 (not very satisfied), and 1 (not at all satisfied). The second pre-
dictor, trust, is operationalized through the question, “I would like to ask you a 
question. How much trust do you have in the European Union? Please tell me if 1 
(you tend not to trust) or 2 (tend to trust it).” 
Finally, to measure the specific support for political authorities, questions about 
the national and European economies are used: “How would you judge the current 
situation in each of the following? a) The situation of the national economy. b) The 
situation of the European economy.” The options were 1 (very bad), 2 (rather bad), 
3 (rather good), and 4 (very good). 
Apart from the respective independent and dependent variables, the analysis also 
used gender, age, and level of education as control variables. In light of the above-
mentioned concepts and operationalization of the variables, the following section 
presents the data analysis. 
 
 
Findings 
 
In this section, the author outlines the results and discusses the key insights ob-
tained from the data analysis. As for the first hypothesis, it is assumed that the cri-
sis prompted a decline in political support throughout the EU, but it is most no-
ticeable in those countries that were hit the hardest by the crisis. The following 
graph shows the percentage of all political support indicators across all member 
states. The figure below confirms a significant drop in both diffuse and specific 
support all across the Union. The most noticeable decline can be seen in the evalu-
ation of the European economy, and it makes sense because during the crisis, the 
EU and its institutions were consistently held responsible for the policies that led 
the continent into recession (Armingeon & Ceka, 2014). 
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Figure 1: Political support across the EU 
 
Source: Own calculation based on Eurobarometer surveys (EB 65.2 and EB 80.1).  
Note: The quantities are population-weighted averages, only positive evaluations are used, and 
“don’t know” answers are excluded.  
Figures 2 and 3 present a comparative picture of political support in the least and 
most affected EU member states. In figure 2, the graph shows that except for trust, 
other diffuse political support indicators in the least affected countries remained 
unchanged, whereas specific support indicators related to the national and EU 
economies both declined significantly. The stable percentage for the diffuse sup-
port indicators in 2006 and 2013 highlights the resilient nature of feeling attached 
to and satisfied with democracy. This proves the ability of diffuse support to pro-
vide a buffer against the widespread erosion of political support (Weßels, 2007). 
 
Figure 2: Political support in the least affected EU member states 
 
Source: Own calculation based on Eurobarometer surveys (EB 65.2 and EB 80.1).  
Note: The quantities are population-weighted averages, only positive evaluations are used, and 
“don’t know” answers are excluded.  
 
Public opinion on the political support indicators in the most affected countries is 
quite different from that in the least affected countries. The graph below shows 
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that all five indicators of both specific and diffuse support declined significantly 
between 2006 and 2013. It is also noticeable that the feeling of identity did not 
tank as much as the other support indicators did. It shows that economic benefits 
are of some importance, but they are not the sole reason for people feeling at-
tached to their respective political community, because even in the harsh economic 
conditions, people in the most affected countries did not lose much of their EU 
sense of identity.  
 
Figure 3: Political Support in the most affected EU member states 
 
Source: Own calculation based on Eurobarometer surveys (EB 65.2 and EB 80.1).  
Note: The quantities are population-weighted averages, only positive evaluations are used, and 
“don’t know” answers are excluded.  
 
To test the remaining two hypotheses and see if information consumption via TV 
played any role in affecting people’s sense of their European identity before and 
after the crisis, a hierarchal linear regression (HLR) was conducted. The reason 
behind using the HLR is that it tests the effect of each set of variables independent-
ly. The following table shows four different blocks, where the variables that are 
similar to a single concept are nested in each block. This allows the author to infer 
how the relationship between a group of independent and dependent variables var-
ies. The results of the analysis are presented in the following table: 
 
Vol.8No.1Spring/Summer 2018  www.globalmediajournal.de 
 
15 
 
Table 2: Hierarchal regression analysis 
Variable 2006 2013 
Block 1 Least Affected Most Affected Least Affected Most Affected
(ß) (ß) (ß) (ß) 
Age −.02 .02 .04*** .01 
Education .10*** .09*** .16*** .13*** 
Gender −.05*** −.01 −.04*** −.00 
∆R2 .01 .008 .03 .02 
Block 2   
Satisfaction with Democracy .36*** .38*** .31*** .33*** 
Trust in the EU .27*** .22*** .24*** .18*** 
∆R2 .29 .26 .21 .19 
Block 3   
Evaluation of the National 
Economy 
.02 .08** .10*** .03** 
Evaluation of the EU 
Economy 
.09*** .06** .04*** .04** 
∆R2 .009 .01 .01 .003 
Block 4   
Information about the EU 
via TV 
.03** −.09*** .05*** .03** 
Information Level about the 
EU 
.10*** .13*** .13*** .09*** 
∆R2 .01 .02 .02 .008 
Total R2 .321 .296 .273 .215 
N 5852 2335 11818 5127 
Note: Standardized regression coefficients are reported and the p-value significance varies: * < 0.1; 
** < 0.05; ***< 0.01. 
 
The above table enables a number of key insights to be made. To grasp the results 
more in their entirety, the outputs with respect to each block will be explained. The 
first block in the table presents the relationship between the covariates (i.e. age, 
gender, and level of education) and the citizens’ sense of their European identity. 
The regression coefficients reveal a similar trend across time and for both groups 
of members. Education is positively associated with a sense of European identity, 
whereas women in the least affected countries do not feel attached as much as men 
do. The second block introduces indicators of diffuse support related to the regime, 
and both have a strong positive relationship with the citizens’ European identity. 
The trend does not change between the two different time periods and among both 
groups of members. It is important to mention that trust and satisfaction with de-
mocracy are both indicators of the same construct, and therefore they are highly 
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correlated. However, the author combined both to make an index in order to solve 
any multicollinearity issues but found that the overall model did not change by 
joining or keeping trust and satisfaction with democracy separate.  
 
In the third block, specific support indicators are induced, and here the relation-
ship does not change, with one key exception, which is that after the Eurozone cri-
sis, the evaluation of national economies in the least affected countries became an 
important predictor of a sense of European identity. On the contrary, the evalua-
tion of the EU economy remained a significantly positive predictor of a European 
identity. It is important to note that the evaluation of the European economy is not 
a very strong predictor of a European identity, as it explains less than 10% of the 
variance in 2006 and 2013 among both groups. Moreover, before the crisis, the 
evaluation of a European identity was a relatively better predictor of identity in 
both groups of member states, whereas after the crisis, its ability to explain the 
variance of the dependent variable was weakened. This indicates that people who 
feel attached to the EU do not necessarily attribute their sense of belonging to its 
economic benefits. 
 
The fourth block in the table shows the impact of TV use for gathering information 
regarding the EU and the respondent’s level of information about the EU on the 
citizens’ European identity. The second hypothesis on video malaise assumes that 
there should be a negative relationship between using the TV as a source of infor-
mation and people’s sense of their European identity, and that this relationship 
should be more obvious in the most affected countries. However, the results show 
that there is no negative relationship between getting EU-related information from 
the TV and a European identity, particularly in the least affected countries. On the 
contrary, in the most affected countries, the relationship between the two variables 
is strong and negative—as expected—but only before the crisis. Furthermore, the 
results indicate that after the Euro crisis, getting information from the TV became 
a weak but significant positive predictor of a European identity in the most affect-
ed countries, which goes against the above-mentioned assumption. As far as the 
respondent’s level of information regarding the EU is concerned, the results reveal 
that it is a positive significant predictor of a European identity, irrespective of the 
time and country. It is also important to note that the respondents’ assessment re-
garding their information about the EU is a better predictor of a European identity 
than the economic perception indicators of specific support are. 
  
Lastly, the results point toward an important aspect and that is the ability of eco-
nomic indicators to predict a European identity. The outputs from the hierarchal 
regression reveal that utilitarian indicators do not impact the model as much as TV 
use and the respondents’ informational level do. Looking at the table, one can see 
that the addition of economic indicators causes a slight change in the adjusted R2, 
demonstrating their inability to improve the overall model and explain a European 
identity. On the other hand, the induction of the video malaise and mobilization 
variables improves the adjusted R2 when compared to the economic indicators.  
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Discussion 
 
There are a number of key takeaways from the findings of this study. What is 
foremost is the indisputable fact that the Eurozone crisis did affect the political 
support of Europeans for the EU, and the most affected countries witnessed a sig-
nificant decline in both specific and diffuse support, hence it confirms the first hy-
pothesis. With regard to the citizens’ sense of their European identity, the results 
show that it did not dramatically decline in the wake of the crisis. As a matter of 
fact, it remained almost similar in the least affected countries, whereas in the most 
affected countries, it reduced by only 14% between 2006 and 2013. This drop is far 
smaller than the decline in any other political support indicator. According to these 
results, one can infer that people’s sense of their European identity neither wanes 
over a short period of time nor because of the economic crisis. This interpretation 
also falls in line with the buffer hypothesis presented by Weßels (2007), according 
to which “identification with the political community creates a buffer” (p. 290) 
against any crisis or political skepticism.  
 
The main crux of this study was to understand the video malaise and media mobi-
lization effects on people’s sense of their European identity. In line with the video 
malaise hypothesis, it is expected that using the TV to seek out information regard-
ing the EU would have a negative effect on the citizens’ European identity. This as-
sumption stems from various research results that reveal the tendency of the me-
dia to mostly cover the EU negatively (Carey & Burton, 2004; Daddow, 2012; Gal-
pin & Trenz, 2016; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006). Therefore, if the media usually por-
tray the EU negatively, such coverage should increase specially amidst a crisis, 
amplifying the negative effect on the citizens’ European identity, hence, it is logical 
to expect a malaise effect, especially in the most affected countries. However, the 
results only partially confirm this assumption presented in the second hypothesis.  
Firstly, in the case of the least affected countries, the given assumption has been 
rejected because the findings reveal that consuming information from the TV has 
not been found to have a negative effect on the citizens’ European identity, in fact, 
the effects are significant and positive. Secondly, in the case of the most affected 
countries, the results partially fall in line with the assumption because they show 
that seeking information via the TV has a significant negative impact on the citi-
zens’ European identity, at least before the crisis, whereas after the crisis, this neg-
ative effect changes into a positive one.  
 
These findings allow the researcher to speculate that information consumption via 
the TV is not associated with a generalized malaise effect; moreover, such an effect, 
if it does appear in some cases, is rather inconsistent, and finally, it does not am-
plify because of the crisis. One explanation for those results is that a European 
identity as an indicator of diffuse political support is resilient to temporal circum-
stances and perhaps changes when the crisis is rather more widespread. These re-
sults from the current investigation and the interpretation correspond to numer-
ous past research studies conducted in different contexts but that reached similar 
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conclusions (see e.g., Holtz-Bacha, 1990; Newton, 1999; Norris, 2000; Pinkleton & 
Austin, 2002; Strömbäck & Shehata, 2010). 
 
As for the mobilization effect, the findings confirm the third hypothesis which pos-
tulates that people get information regarding different political structures and is-
sues from the media, that, in turn, increases their level of political information, 
and this informed-ness proves to be a better predictor of their identity. Thus, me-
dia consumption in general and TV in the present case can be attributed as having 
a positive effect on the citizens’ European identity. Furthermore, the media mobili-
zation effect does not change in the wake of a crisis.  
 
Limitations 
In the present study, a secondary data analysis was undertaken, which has its own 
typical problems. One limitation is that identity is a dynamic and flexible concept, 
but the operationalization is confined due to the availability of only one variable 
that could be deemed to be imperfect for measuring identity (Bruter, 2008). How-
ever, owing to the fact that such an operationalization is commonly used in empiri-
cal analyses on citizens’ European identity (Westle, 2012), the author considers at-
tachment as an appropriate indicator with which to measure this European identi-
ty. It also falls in line with social psychology theories that consider affective at-
tachment as a key indicator of a collective identity (Tajfel, 1981). Despite the ap-
propriateness of the indicator that was employed, multiple pointers should be used 
to estimate identity (e.g. the cognitive and evaluative identity dimensions can pro-
vide some useful indicators).  
 
Furthermore, the operationalization adopted to examine the video malaise effect 
might be considered questionable, because malaise is associated not only with us-
ing the TV as a source of information but also with the nature of the content. This 
highlights the need for data that are based on a specific media content analysis and 
public opinion on that content, and future studies should take this into considera-
tion. Similarly, the mobilization effect indicator that was used could also be argued 
to be inapt. However, the author defends the use of this indicator by arguing that 
people get information regarding political issues from the media. Consequently, 
their informed-ness is brought about via their media consumption and that is the 
media mobilization effect.  
In conclusion, the author argues that this study fills the gap by adding to the litera-
ture on the effects of the media on political support, particularly in the context of 
the Euro crisis. The findings confirm that TV use does not lead to political cynicism 
and a decline in political support, but it instead makes people more informed 
about different political structures and issues. Furthermore, it also rejects the no-
tion that people’s sense of their European identity can only be explained through a 
cost–benefit calculus. On the contrary, it is embedded among Europeans on more 
abstract levels and serves as a buffer in times of political turmoil. 
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Annex  
 
Real GDP growth rate - volume 
Country 2010 2011 2012 2013 Average 
Belgium 2.7 1.8 0.1 −0.1 1.13 
Czech Republic 2.3 2 −0.8 −0.5 0.75 
Denmark 1.9 1.3 0.2 0.9 1.08 
Germany 4.1 3.7 0.5 0.5 2.20 
Estonia 2.3 7.6 4.3 1.4 3.90 
Ireland 2 0 −1.1 1.1 0.50 
Greece −5.5 −9.1 −7.3 −3.2 −6.28 
Spain 0 −1 −2.9 −1.7 −1.40 
France 2 2.1 0.2 0.6 1.23 
Italy 1.7 0.6 −2.8 −1.7 −0.55 
Cyprus 1.3 0.3 −3.2 −6 −1.90 
Latvia −3.8 6.4 4 2.6 2.30 
Lithuania 1.6 6 3.8 3.5 3.73 
Luxembourg 4.9 2.5 −0.4 4 2.75 
Hungary 0.7 1.7 −1.6 2.1 0.73 
Malta 3.5 1.3 2.5 4.6 2.98 
Netherlands 1.4 1.7 −1.1 −0.2 0.45 
Austria 1.9 2.8 0.7 0.1 1.38 
Poland 3.6 5 1.6 1.4 2.90 
Portugal 1.9 −1.8 −4 −1.1 −1.25 
Slovenia 1.2 0.6 −2.7 −1.1 −0.50 
Slovakia 5 2.8 1.7 1.5 2.75 
Finland 3 2.6 −1.4 −0.8 0.85 
Sweden 6 2.7 −0.3 1.2 2.40 
United Kingdom 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.9 1.65 
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